In this paper, we address the incentives to invest in environmental innovation of enterprises that exercise market power in the output market and also buy and sell pollution permits. Di¤erently from the existing literature, using a market approach we explicitly model the interaction between the output market, where …rms play à la Cournot, and the permits market. We …nd that, in the new equilibrium …rms behave symmetrically, that is, they either both innovate to protect their market share in the output market or they both choose not to innovate. Whether the innovation equilibrium arises or not depends on the output demand and on the productivity enhancement and not on the distribution of permits among …rms. Finally, we show that, under this market con…guration, collusion can be welfare enhancing.
Introduction
In this paper, we address the incentives to invest in environmental innovation of enterprises that exert market power in the output market. These …rms also buy and sell pollution permits. Many papers have drawn their attention to the incentives of …rms to invest in less pollutant technologies but only Montero (2002) has taken into account strategic interaction in the output market. A major outcome of the previous paper is that incentives to innovate depend on the decrease in permit's price due to investment in R&D 1 . On the contrary, we show that innovation can determine an increase in permits'price, leading to a higher cost of output production. This result is derived using a market approach to model the permits market, rather than a bargaining process.
Moreover, most of the literature regarding market power, claims that the allocation of permits among …rms has important e¢ ciency implications. Our main contribution in this regard is that, under Cournot competition, the allocation of permits among …rms has no e¤ect neither on e¢ ciency nor on incentives to innovate. In this strategic context, it is shown that innovation incentives mainly depend on output demand and productivity enhancement resulting from technological improvement.
As Montero (2002) , most of the papers in this area are devoted to the comparison of the incentives to innovate under alternative pollution control rules. To do so, in general, the interaction between the pollution market and the output market is neglected, or only a single monopoly …rm is considered in the output market. This is the case in Wenders (1975) , Tietenberg (1985) , Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989) who show that market-based instruments such as tradeable permits provide more incentives to environmental innovation than command-and-control instruments. More recently, other authors, pursuing the same objective, introduce explicitly the output market, but most of them consider it as a competitive one (Requate (1995) and Parry (1998) ). Most of these papers represents environmental innovation as an R&D sector which produces a (proportional) decrease in the cost of abatement per unit of R&D investment.
In contrast with this previous literature, we adopt a di¤erent de…nition of environmental innovation. We account for innovation that, instead of simply reducing the marginal cost of abatement 2 , produces a change in the intensity of emissions per unit of input used in production, like in Bréchet and Jouvet (2006) . This general speci…cation is particularly relevant in the case of some pollutants like C02 where for many sectors reducing emissions requires changing the production process itself 3 , and not just investing in some end of pipe technology.
We develop a model of two …rms that compete à la Cournot in the output market. The decision to innovate is modelled as a sequential game, whose payo¤s are composed both from the revenue of the output market and from the revenue or cost from the market for permits. Firms'interaction in the output market gives birth to the demand and the supply of permits in the permits market. Firms receive for free an amount of pollution permits that can be di¤erent from the optimal amount of permits needed to produce the output. Accordingly, the "extra" permits of one …rm become the supply of permits; and the "shortage" of permits of the other constitutes the demand of permits. In the output market, the price of permits is taken as given, and therefore, the optimal quantities of permits are chosen as a function of their price. This structure reminds the "technology-linked" markets setup proposed by Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006b) . However, there is an important di¤erence between the latter and the present one: in this paper the same …rms play both in the output market and in the market for permits. Our innovation game is also reminiscent of the one in Gabszewicz and Garella (1995) . The decision to innovate or not is similar to the choice whether or not to internalize production of an intermediate good in the latter paper.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, the game and the equilibrium analysis, Section 3 discusses welfare e¢ ciency and allocation of permits while Section 4 concludes. 2 This way of modeling environmental innovation is generally inspired on the characteristics of SO2 markets where emissions can be reduced by investing in end of pipe technologies: 3 Many electricity plants switch to Integrated Gasi…cation Combined Cycle (IGCC) coal generation as they are capable of separating and capturing C02 emissions at a lower cost than conventional coal combustion power plants. For more details on technical issues see Stephens and van der Zwaan (2005).
The model
Assume there are two symmetric …rms that produce an homogeneous good y using the same technology
Input x is a polluting good. For each …rm, emissions e from the use of input x are given by the technology
Hence, technology of producing output y in terms of emissions can be expressed by simply substituting (2) in (1)
In order to comply with the environmental regulation, each …rms must hold one pollution permit for each emission unit. This is what will be call the "full compliance assumption" and allows this paper to talk indistinctly about optimal level of emissions or optimal level of permits used.
Firms face a linear demand for their output, p = 1 y; and they compete à la Cournot in the output market. They are assigned for free an amount of permits and (1 ) respectively, of the total amount of permits S: As long as the amount of permits is assigned equally, there is no exchange of permits. Instead, if …rms receive di¤erent amount of permits, i.e., 6 = 1 2 ; then a market for permits arises. The …rm getting a higher number of permits may become the seller of permits, while the …rm receiving the smaller share may become the buyer of permits. Our full compliance assumption makes permits a necessary input in this polluting industry.
Firms have the possibility to invest in environmental innovation or better to adopt a new technology that is characterized by a lower pollution intensity. Given our interest in markets where the …rms emit CO2 to the atmosphere, we characterize the technology change as Hicks-neutral: environmental innovation is a change in the coe¢ cient of emissions'technology from k tok wherek > k; consequently, the marginal productivity of emissions increases 5 . Since we want to highlight the e¤ects of strategic interaction in the innovation decision, we assume that the cost of innovation is the same for both …rms, and equal to zero for simplicity. The restrictionsk < 2k and
are imposed throughout the model to guarantee that both …rms make non negative pro…ts for all outcomes 6 . Notice that the domain f ; k; Sg satisfying these restrictions is non empty 7 .
The game
Before playing, each …rm knows the total amount of permits available S and the proportion and (1 ) that each of them will get. The innovation game is modelled as a sequential game. Stage one consists of the simultaneous choice whether to invest in innovation or not. In stage two, …rms'strategies are output quantities, y A and y B respectively, and they are assumed to play Cournot. Accordingly, payo¤s in the second stage game obtain as follows:
where q is the price of permits, and e A and e B are the amount of emissions emitted by …rm A and …rm B, respectively.
Denote by (Non innov, Non innov), and call outcome (1) the …rst-stage choice in which none of the …rms chooses to innovate. The payo¤ pair in this outcome is
Similarly, for the other three outcomes of the …rst-stage game. When …rms have to play the …rst stage game, i.e., the innovation game, under the assumption that their behavior satis…es the criterion of subgame perfection, they consider the matrix game depicted below: 5 A well-known example where innovation is modelled in the same way can be found in Sharon, Oster (1982). 6 Firstly, note that the conditionk k 2 is necesary for the existence of equilibrium in the permits market. This conditions yields a positively sloped supply of permits coming from the …rm receiving The equilibrium of the game depends on the di¤erence, for each agent, in the payo¤ coming both from outputs'and permits'markets. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the two-stage game are identi…ed through backward induction. 
Second
If the amount of permits assigned to …rm A is > ; then S e A represents the supply of permits. Similarly, the total payo¤ of …rm B is:
Standard computations of Cournot equilibrium give the optimal quantity of emissions chosen by each …rm:
Permits'market equilibrium Since …rms are symmetric, their optimal level of emissions is the same. Consequently, each …rm becomes either a buyer or a seller of permits depending on the amount of permits received ( S or (1 )S respectively) as compared with expression (7).
The demand D and supply O of permits are indirectly de…ned in the optimal decision of the …rm in the output market. If > 1 2 , …rm A is the supplier of permits and supply is:
Analogously, we get the demand of permits as:
Then, from the equilibrium condition O = D in the market for permits, the permits price q 1 that clears the market for the entire quantity S obtains as:
Hence, substituting (8) in (7),
Substituting the optimal level of emissions in the production function (3) we …nd the optimal level of output for each enterprise:
Outcome (2): both …rms innovate
Outcome (2) of the second stage game is analogous to outcome (1): …rms use the same improved environmental-e¢ cient technology. Production of each …rm is now respectively y A = k e A and y B = k e B wherek > k: Therefore, for a given amount of emissions, a higher level of production can be obtained.
Following the procedure in the previous section, we …nd the equilibrium price in the market of permits q 2 when both …rms innovate as
It follows,
Lemma 1
The permits'price q 2 when both …rms innovate is higher (lower) than the permits price q 1 when none of the …rms innovate if the productivity improvement is lower (higher) than a threshold value.
Proof. See Appendix. The above lemma claims that, given the exogenous variables f ; k; Sg ; there is a set of productivity improvement valuesk k for which innovation makes the permits price increase. This result is new for the literature concerning pollution permits. The importance of this result is clear as permits' price represent the cost of producing output y having a direct impact on incentives to innovate.
By symmetry, the optimal emissions e A 2 and e B 2 when both …rms innovate is equal to
Hence, the optimal output for each enterprise is higher than output in outcome (1) and is equal to
Outcome (3): only agent A innovates
Output market equilibrium When only one …rm innovates competition is no longer de…ned as a symmetric Cournot. Instead, the enterprise that innovates is more e¢ cient having a lower unit cost of production. If, in this case, …rm A is the one innovating, it maximizes
Similarly, the total payo¤ of the …rm that does not innovate, in this case …rm B, is
Di¤erentiating A and B ; respectively, with respect to e A and e B and solving the resulting system, we …nd the optimal emission for each agent as a function of permits'price, namely,
Permits'market equilibrium As before, comparing the optimal level of emissions in (16) and (17) with the amount of permits assigned to each …rm, each …rm is either a buyer or a seller. This determines the equilibrium price in the market for permits. Therefore from the equilibrium condition 8 ,
the equilibrium permit price is:
Substituting (18) in (16) and (17) we get the optimal level of emissions both for agent A who innovated and for agent B:
(20) 8 The best response function of agent A; e A 3 ; is a function of e B 3 and q; but e B 3 itself is a function of q. Hence, the e¤ect of the price of permits q on e A 3 passes through two channels: a direct one, found in the best response function of agent A, and an indirect one, coming from the e¤ect of q on B's best response function e A 3 (e B 3 (q)): Ifk > 2k; the indirect e¤ect overcomes the direct e¤ect, or said di¤erently, the substitution strategic e¤ect intrinsic in the Cournot game overcomes the direct e¤ect of the permits price q. To have a meaningful interaction and the existence of permits market we need the direct e¤ect to be the prelavent one Then, substituting the optimal level of emissions in the production function we …nd the optimal level of output for each agent:
Outcome (4): only agent B innovates
Outcome (4) is analogous to outcome (3) but …rm B is the one innovating instead of …rm A. This means that, in the output market, …rm B(A) will behave in outcome (4) as …rm A(B) behaved in outcome (3) . Notice that, as total emissions at equilibrium are always exactly equal to S, the fact that only one agent innovates already implies that part of the polluting input is being used more e¢ ciently from an environmental point of view, leading to a higher level of output for the same overall level of emissions S: Accordingly, taking into account the fact that when both agents simultaneously, innovate, total output increases (see (10) (13)), we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If at least one …rm innovates, total output supplied increases, compared with the output level when no …rm innovates.
Proof. See Appendix.
Moreover,
Proposition 3
The price of permits is independent from the allocation of permits ; in all outcomes of the game.
Proof. Simple observation of equations (8), (11) and (18) . The relevance of permits allocation among agents in terms of price e¢ -ciency (i.e. in terms of the monetary burden of pollution control) was studied by Hahn (1984) . In this paper, since the dominant …rm acts as a monopolist (monopsonist) in order to rise (or depress) permits price, the amount of permits allocated to the dominant determines its position on the permits market and therefore permits price e¢ ciency. In the same line Eshel (2005) …nds that determines the degree of market power of the dominant …rm in the permits market and it can "balance" its market power in the output market 9 . Under perfect competition in the output market, the relevance of is even greater as the amount of permits received is the only opportunity for positive pro…ts.
Instead, we model output market interaction introducing competition à la Cournot. This changes the role of permits allocation even in the case of asymmetric Cournot competition: giving to the most e¢ cient agent (or we could say the "dominant " …rm in the output market) the exact amount of permits needed for production does not change the price of permits (or unit cost of input) 10 . Then, in our model the value of has no e¢ ciency implications.
First-stage game
In this section, …rms consider the matrix payo¤s (4). Agent A chooses whether to innovate or not for every possible choice of agent B, and viceversa.
Firm A' s best response Agent A compares the payo¤ realized in outcome (1) and in outcome (3). Innovating is a best response for A when B is not innovating i¤:
The previous inequality can be developed as:
9 See Sanin (2007) for further analysis on this issue. 10 The previous discussion has one further implication: given that e¢ ciency in the permits market does not depend on ; also welfare function becomes independent of . Hence, in this setup environmental regulation should no longer be concerned with permits allocation among agents.
Moreover, given the social bene…t from innovation, the role of the regulator to induce the economy to settle at outcome (2) would be relevant, if possible. But notice that the total amount of permits made available S has no role in the incentives to innovate. This is the case because what makes the economy end up in outcome (2) or (1) is the interaction between output demand and the level of productivity enhancement, both exogenous and given for the regulator.
where
where p = p 4 p 2 and m A = m (1) and, on the other hand, his payo¤ in outcome (3) versus outcome (2) . Given the symmetry of the …rms the following conditions, are similar to condition (25) and (26), respectively. In particular, …rm B innovates when …rm A is not innovating i¤: 
11 Condition (1) imposes a condition for innovation depending on the e¤ect that innovation has on the output market revenue coming (i) from a change in output price; (ii) on market share ; and (iii) the change in the relative price of permits (as these can either be used in the production of y or sold in the permits' market). The RHS of inequality (1) is made of two elements: the …rst q p1 (1 2 ) is the change in the relative price of the permits as a cost, < (26) and (28) are both satis…ed. Notice that, which of these equations is more restrictive for reaching the equilibrium depends, for a given ; on the relationship between prices across outcomes. Then, it follows:
Proposition 4 If q 4 < q 2 ; outcome (2) INNOVATE-INNOVATE, is a NE of the game i¤:
while if q 4 > q 2 ;outcome (2) INNOVATE-INNOVATE, is a NE of the game i¤:
Proof. See Appendix. Similarly, the pair of strategies (Non Innovate, Non Innovate) is a NE equilibrium in the …rst stage game if and only if conditions (25) and (27) hold with the reversed sign. Then, depending on to the relationship between q 1 and q 3 it follows:
Proposition 5 If q 1 < q 3 outcome (1) NOT INNOV-NOT INNOV is an equilibrium of the game i¤
while if q 1 > q 3 outcome (1) is an equilibrium i¤
The uniqueness of the …rst stage symmetric equilibrium Is it possible that both the pairs of strategies (Innovate, Innovate) and (Non Innovate, Non Innovate) are simultaneously equilibria of the …rst stage game? Notice that the sets of parameters f ; k; Sg where multiple equilibria of the game could exist are de…ned by q 1 > q 3 = q 4 > q 2 if < 1 2
; or q 1 < q 3 = q 4 < q 2 if > : The previous question can be answered studying whether the following systems have a solution:
8 < :
( 2 1)) that arise from q 1 < q 3 and q 4 < q 2 ; and 8 < :
( 1 2 ))
( 1 2 )) that arise from q 1 > q 3 and q 4 > q 2 :
Proposition 6 The two pairs of strategies (Innovate, Innovate) and (Not innovate, not innovate) are mutually exclusive.
The impossibility of asymmetric equilibria The question is whether it is possible that B prefers outcome (3) to outcome (2) while A prefers outcome (3) to outcome (1) making outcome (3) a possible …rst stage NE. Given the symmetry between outcome (3) and (4) proving this is the same as proving that outcome (4) is never an equilibrium. The following proposition proves this can never be the case:
The …rst stage game has no asymmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix. The previous propositions underlines the importance of the output market characteristics and how such characteristics a¤ect the incentives to innovate through the permits market exchange. In fact, the unit cost for the buyer of permits, q (revenue for the seller), may be higher or lower depending on output demand's characteristics yielding di¤erent conditions required for innovation to be the outcome of the game.
Environmental regulation covers di¤erent sectors such as energy and transport. Industries like electricity, for example, are often characterized by a wellknown inelastic demand (Sanin (2005) ) while other sectors like ‡ight transport have a highly elastic demand. This paper emphasizes how industries with di¤erent output markets characteristics may di¤er in their innovation behavior.
Welfare considerations
This section is dedicated to study the welfare e¤ect of innovation. The economy is composed of two …rms, as described in the above model, and consumers that internalize emissions as a "bad" in their utility function U (S; y).
The equilibrium (Innovation, Innovation) Pareto dominates the equilibrium (Not innovate, Not innovate) if both …rms have a higher pro…t in outcome (2) than outcome (1) with at least one of them with a strictly higher pro…t. The conditions under which this is the case can be obtained comparing pro…ts of each …rm in outcome (1) and in outcome (2), i.e.:
(
The investigation of the two systems yields that the innovation outcome Pareto dominates the non innovation outcome if and only if innovation strictly increases each …rm'pro…t. Indeed, innovation is a pro…table strategy for each …rm if the inequality S(k + k) < holds for …rm B. Given ; it is straightforward to check that only one of these condition on S(k+k) is binding, namely the condition bearing on the permits'buyer side 12 . On the other hand, from direct comparison of the sum of pro…ts in outcome (1) and (2), it can be seen that the sum of pro…ts in the innovation 12 If < outcome is higher than the sum of pro…ts in the non-innovation outcome, regardless of productivity enhancement 13 . Moreover, innovation is always welfare improving from the consumers point of view as it implies an increase in total output and a decrease in output price for a given level of pollution. Hence, the question arises on how to induce …rms to choose outcome (2) instead of outcome (1) for every play.
One possible answer is allowing for collusion: given that the sum of pro…ts is strictly higher in outcome (2) it could be optimal for the …rm that is better o¤ after innovation to pay a compensation to the other …rm instead of being in outcome (1) . Maximizing collusive pro…t M is as maximizing pro…ts of a single …rm that produces total output y: Its pro…ts after innovation are S; the monopolist uses all permits available S which implies that its price of output is p M = (1 k S); as in the innovation outcome of the Cournot game. Then, collusion is welfare enhancing if receiving half of the collusion pro…ts is higher than the pro…ts that both, the buyer and the seller of permits receive in the non-innovation outcome separately, namely, (
Consider one of the possible combination of parameters that yield a noninnovation equilibrium, i.e. S = 1; = 0:1;k = 0:4; k = 0:38; and note that these satisfy e M = 1 2 k > S: For this combination of parameters both inequalities in (31) are satis…ed when is such that 0:53 > > 0:47: This means that, for each combination of parameters that yield a non innovation equilibrium there exists some level of for which there is place for pro…table compensation between …rms to achieve the innovation outcome improving welfare. More precisely, when the seller (buyer) does not have a strong long (short) position, each of them is better o¤ agreeing on innovating and dividing collusion pro…ts in halves than achieving the non-innovation outcome through Cournot competition. Therefore, allowing for collusion is welfare improving 13 The sum of pro…ts in (2) is higher than the sum of pro…ts in (1) if p1 p2 <k k that is if k S >k k+k :Recall that the conditionk k 2k k < k S is always satis…ed for feasibility of this model. This latter inequality is more restricting than k S >k k+k :
as …rms are better o¤ without harming consumers 14 . It follows, Proposition 8 When two Cournot players are also buyer or seller of the input used to produce the output, there exists collusive equilibria that are welfare improving
Finally, notice that there can be other equilibria where welfare improvement from collusion is even stronger depending on the utility function of consumers. This is the case when the cap on emissions is not binding for the monopolist, i.e. e M = 1 2 k < S leading to a higher level of environmental quality. Let us assume a separable utility function of consumers where the partial derivative with respect to S is bigger than the partial derivative with respect to consumption of y: In this case there is a larger number of possible welfare improving collusive equilibria.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the incentives for …rms to invest in environmental innovation. The decision to innovate is modelled as a sequential game of two …rms that compete à la Cournot in the output market. Payo¤s are composed both from the revenue of the output market and from the revenue or cost from the permits market. In fact, di¤erently from the existing literature, we introduce the innovation game in a framework where both the output market and the permits market are considered. Through the intra-market interaction we establish a link between output demand, productivity enhancement due to innovation, market structure and incentives to innovate.
The main result is that if two symmetric …rms compete both in the output and in the permits market, the new equilibrium is again symmetric; whether in this new equilibrium …rms innovate or not, depends mainly on the e¤ects that innovation has on the cost of production and therefore on market power in the output market (and on permits market revenue). Previous literature …nd that when innovation is not costly it is always undertaken as it provokes a decrease in the unit cost of production (price of permits). On the contrary, 14 Recall that when we show that innovation can determine an increase in permits'price, leading to a higher cost of output production.
Moreover, most of the literature regarding market power claims that the allocation of permits among …rms has important e¢ ciency implications. Our main contribution in this regard is that, under Cournot competition, the allocation of permits among …rms has no e¤ect neither on e¢ ciency nor on incentives to innovate. In this strategic context, it is shown that innovation incentives mainly depend on output demand and productivity enhancement resulting from technological improvement.
From the policy makers view point, our main contribution is that the allocation of permits among …rms has no e¤ect neither on e¢ ciency nor on incentives to innovate. In this sense we also show that, collusion may be welfare improving.
The paper can be extended in several ways, for a start, end of pipe abatement costs could be introduced to account for abatement's cost reducing innovation. Moreover, dynamics could be introduced in the decisions to innovate taking into account the interaction with the decision to bank permits by the …rms. Finally, the model in this paper could also be used to study the incentives of incumbents to deter entry of new arrivals in the output market through actions in the permits market. ak with a 2 (1; 2) representing the productivity enhacement.
Then, the derivative of (11) with respect to a is:
akS) @a = k(1 3 kSa) that can be possitive or negative. Particularly, it is possitive for a set of values of f ; k; Sg for which a < 
Proof of Proposition 2
Since it is the case that e A = S e B , the total output in outcome (3) can be written as
Then, output in (3) is higher than in (1) if k S e B (k k) > kS that after rearranging becomes S > e B which is always true.
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: Recall condition (26) is
and that in equilibrium it is the case that:
Then, substituting the previous inequalities in condition (28) for B, this condition becomes:
Then, condition (28) is more binding than condition in (26) if
that after rearranging becomes a condition on the relationship among the equilibrium price of permits and :
condition (28) is binding if q 4 < (>)q 2 ; otherwise condition in (26) is binding.
Step 2:Then, for a given , wether q 4 is higher or lower than q 2 determines wich condition needs to be satis…ed for having an INNOVATION-INNOVATION equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1: Recall that condition (25) is not sati…ed when
and that in equilibrium it is the case that p 3 = p 4 ; q 3 = q 4 ; e Substituting the previous values in the condition of violation of (27) we …nd that the condition under wich it is optimal for B not to innovate is more binding that the condition for wich it is optimal for A not innovate (violation of (25)) if:
; violation of condition (27) is binding if q 4 > (<)q 1 ; otherwise violation of condition (25) is binding.
Step 2:Then, for a given , wether q 4 is higher or lower than q 1 determines wich condition needs to be satis…ed for having an NON INNOVATION-NON INNOVATION equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5: Uniqueness
Step 1: Consider the system between the condition for the innovation equilibrium to arrise and the condition for the non-innovation equilibrium:
Step 2: We prove that both inequalities cannot be satis…ed simultaneously.
We know that:
The …rst inequality can be simpli…ed as:
where m 
Similarly, the second inequality can be rewriten as:
As it is always the case that k <k, the LHS of (32) is higher than RHS of (33).
Therefore, there is no multiple equilibria if the following inequality is violated:
Substituting inside the previous q 4 = 1 2k
kS) and taking into account that p = 1 y we show that proving that the previous inequality is violated simply means proving the following positive:
Now we study the sign of each of the functions in (34):
Lets callk = ak. For di¤erent values of a 2 (1; 2) the previous function is positive or negative depending on the value of k (see graph): 
Ask 2 >kk this function is negative due to the negative component (k 1). It is the case thatk < 1 to ensure that output price p 2 = 1 k S is possitive as for this proof we take = 1; S = 1:
Hence, (34) is satis…ed meaning we have a unique equilibriun in the admissible set of ; k;k; S:
Step 3: The incompatibility of the following system can be proven following the previous reasoning: If the previous two inequalities are satis…ed simultaneously there exists an asymetric equilibria. Then, after rearranging the system becomes: and k <k. Then, the LHS of the …rst inequality in the system is lower than LHS of the second inequality meaning that they are satis…ed simultaneously if:
2 ) + q 2 (2 1) + p 3 k Then, for …nding the set of parameters for which an assymetric equilibria is not possible we must …nd the parameters for wich the following inequality is true:
2 ) + q 2 (2 1) + p 3 k
Substituting equilibrium values: q 3 = 1 2k
k (k+k 3kk S) (k 2 k k+k 2 ) ; q 2 = k (1 Hence, the sign of the overall function is positive meaning that there is no possible asymetric equilibria in the admisible set of ; k,k; S: Then, we have proved that the symmetric equilibria are unique.
